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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background of the study 
Earnings management is vastly researched field of financial and accounting literature. 
Companies, and their executives, have various motivations for exercising earnings 
management such as avoiding debt covenant violations, increasing their compensation from 
bonus plans and exceeding analyst estimates or previous year’s earnings in order to receive 
higher return from the stock market (DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994, Healy 1985, Bartov et al. 
2002). Almost 87 % of the executives themselves agree that managing earnings to meet 
earnings benchmarks, such as analyst estimates or last year’s earnings, helps the company to 
build credibility with the capital market (Graham et al. 2005). 
 
To investigate earnings management across different countries this study uses the Benford’s 
law to find anomalous patterns in the reported earnings. The Benford’s law gives the 
distribution of numbers as first, second, third etc. significant digit of lists of numbers that 
represent the relative size of similar phenomena, such as net incomes, daily trading volumes 
on stock exchange or market values (Nigrini & Mittermaier 1997). According to the 
Benford’s law zero and nine should occur as a second digit 11.97 % and 8.5 % of the time, 
respectively. This study investigates do executives of companies exercise small rounding of 
numbers in order to increase perception that the financial statement readers receive from 
earning figures. If pre-managed net earnings of a company are for example 4.95 million 
(currency irrelevant) executives are probably keen to manipulate that over the 5 million 
threshold, since it requires manipulation of only 0.05 million (or approximately 1 %) but will 
change the first number from four to five.  
 
Brenner & Brenner (1982) argued that due to limited memory capacity people tend to round 
number downwards even though sometimes it would be more accurate to round them 
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upwards which requires more short term cognitive capacity. From an accounting perspective 
it’s quite reasonable to expect that companies would like to report (in most cases) as high 
profits as possible, within legal and moral limits, and take advantage of peoples cognitive 
shortcuts regarding their perception of numbers by rounding the net profit numbers upwards 
if it’s possible to change the first number with relatively small effort. This kind of small 
rounding of earnings figures should result to distribution where zero occurs more than it 
should and nine occurs less than it should under the Benford’s law. This would be interpreted 
as earnings management, or more specifically cosmetic earnings management as named by 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) in their study Who Is Miss World in Cosmetic Earnings 
Management? A Cross-National Comparison of Small Upward Rounding Of Net Income 
Numbers among Eighteen Countries.  
 
One of the biggest advantages of Benford’s law as a method to detect earnings management 
is its intuitiveness over the more traditional models used in earnings management literature 
such as, accrual based models and anomalous distributions around earnings thresholds such 
as last year’s earnings or analyst estimates. For cross-country study the Benford’s law offers 
especially suitable tool since analyst estimates from various countries might be difficult to 
obtain and accrual policies might vary between different countries and accounting standards. 
 
Although earnings management have been studied in various contexts institutional factors, 
other than investor protection, regarding the home country of a company haven’t been much 
emphasized in previous literature. Institutional factors such as the average of three legal 
variable from La Porta et al. (1998) have usually been as a control variable but not at the 
main interest of previous studies. Investigating the importance of reporting incentives and 
earnings management in European private and public companies Burgstahler et al. (2006) 
found that earnings management is more evident in countries with weaker legal structures 
and enforcement. In another cross-country study (Leuz et al. 2003) found negative 
relationship between legal enforcement and earnings management while investigating 
earnings management from the perspective of investor protection. Shen & Chih (2005) also 
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studied investor protection but in the often excluded banking industry and found that stronger 
legal enforcement actually results in more earnings management in low-income countries. 
So the findings of previous studies regarding an institutional factor, legal enforcement, are a 
bit contradictory with each other and this study tries to bring insight to earnings management 
and broader set of institutional factors, the Governance Indicators.  
 
Governance comprises of the beliefs, cultures and institutions by which authority in a country 
is operated. The Governance Indicators which are used in this study as institutional measures 
of the governance in the home country of companies consists of six broad dimensions of 
governance; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These six dimensions 
offer insightful tool to investigate does the governance of a country have an effect to the 
cosmetic earnings management exercised in the companies residing there. (The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project.) 
 
1.2. Objectives and contribution 
This study has two major objectives. First this study adds to the existing accounting literature 
regarding international cosmetic earnings management, which is currently quite narrow. 
Second this study is first of its kind in regard to investigating the relationship between 
cosmetic earnings management and the Governance Indicators. Carslaw (1988), Thomas 
(1989) and Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) have used the Benford’s law to detect cosmetic 
earnings management in a single country studies (Carslaw (1988) New Zealand and Thomas 
(1989) United States) and in cross-country studies (Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) 18 
countries). On top of these three studies there aren’t many studies which would have utilized 
the Benford’s law in detecting cosmetic earnings management. These three studies are also 
13 – 28 years old so this study offers an updated view on the use of the Benford’s law in 
detecting cosmetic earnings management across 43 countries.  
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To investigate the relationship between institutional factors of a country and cosmetic 
earnings management this study uses the Governance Indicators which haven’t been 
previously used in an accounting literature, at least to the author’s knowledge, and overall 
institutional factors haven’t been widely studied in earnings management literature. This 
study aims to fill that research gap in existing accounting and earnings management literature. 
The findings and results of this study can act as a reference point for future studies trying to 
investigate cosmetic earnings management or earnings management in general and 
institutional factors such as the Governance Indicators or other similar measures. Better 
understanding of the relationship between earnings management and institutional factors 
enables the consumers of financial statements better capabilities to understand the 
trustworthiness of them. Deeper understanding of the relationship, which future research 
regarding this issue might bring, also helps to give better insight to the determinants of 
earnings management in different institutional settings.  
 
1.3. Structure 
This thesis is organized as follows. In the section two prior literature about earnings 
management is introduced and reader is given broad picture of prior literature. Methods that 
have previously been used in earnings management literature are also introduced in the 
section two so that the reader can distinguish how the method of this study separates from 
them and offers more intuitive tool to investigate earnings management especially in cross-
country context.  
 
Section three offers overview of selected literature regarding cross-country comparison of 
earnings management. Hypothesis development, data and methodology are presented in 
section four which leads to section five where the results of this study are presented. Section 
six explains the main results of this study and concludes.  
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2. Earnings management 
 
2.1. Definition and background  
Throughout previous literature about earnings management have been defined little bit 
differently from time to time but one of the most used definitions is by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999, p. 368): 
 “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
 
Other definitions include for example one by Schipper (1989, p. 92): “purposeful intervention 
in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process).”…”could occur in 
any part of the external disclosure process, and could take a number of forms. A minor 
extension to the definition would encompass “real” earnings management, accomplished by 
timing investment or financing decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it.”  
 
Even though by the time articles were published there wasn’t much understanding about the 
prevalence of “real” earnings management, Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
recognized it as part of the earnings management (Zang 2012). From the 1970s onwards 
earnings management literature was more concentrated on investigating the determinants of 
accounting choice and during the 1980s the focus changed to primarily to investigate accrual 
management (Beneish 2001). From the late 1990s onwards earnings management literature 
has seen increasing amount of real earnings management studies (Xu et al. 2007).  
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Real earnings manipulation, real activities manipulation from here on, is usually understood 
to mean actions such as increasing sales through price discounts, overproduction or reduction 
of discretionary expenditures, which wouldn’t have been executed in normal course of 
operations, by the management to alter financial reporting figures in attempt to meet certain 
reporting goals (Roychowdhury 2006; Xu et al. 2007). Compared to accrual management 
real activities manipulation have effects on operating activities and potentially can even 
reduce firm value, since for example increasing sales through price discounts in the current 
period can reduce cash flows in future periods (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010).  
 
Whereas real activities manipulation is made possible by the freedom of managers to affect 
their operations, accrual management is made possible by discretion given to the managers 
over some accounting principles, such as revenue recognition and the matching principle. 
Although intention of the accrual based accounting is to increase accuracy of financial 
reporting it also leaves room for managerial discretion that can potentially lead to inaccurate 
earnings reporting. (Dechow 1994) 
 
Dechow & Skinner (2000) presented illustration about the difference of “fraudulent” 
accounting and earnings management (table 1). Table 1 shows that managers have several 
different ways to manipulate earnings even within generally accepted accounting standards 
(GAAP) from overly aggressive recognition of provisions or reserves and overvaluation of 
acquired in-process R&D in purchase acquisitions to drawing down provisions or reserves in 
an overly aggressive manner. Real activities manipulation, such as delaying sales and 
postponing R&D or advertisings expenditures, offers managers another set of tools to manage 
earnings. Dechow & Skinner (2000) didn’t mention for example overproduction or 
increasing / decreasing selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses as ways to 
manipulate earnings but academics later have also acknowledged these operational choices 
to manage earnings (e.g. Roychowdhury 2006; Lin et al. 2006; Gunny 2010; Zang 2012). 
Increasing the production amounts managers can spread fixed overhead costs over a larger 
number of units, and thus decrease cost of goods sold (COGS), as long as there isn’t any 
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increase in marginal cost in the current period or inventory holding costs don’t offset it 
(Gunny 2010).  
 
 
 
Table 1: The distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management (Dechow & Skinner 2000). 
Violates GAAP
"Fraudulent" 
Accounting
Recording sales before they are 
"realizable"
Recording fictitious sales
Backdating sales invoices
Overstating inventory by 
recording fictitious inventory
"Aggressive" 
Accounting
Understatement of the provision 
for bad debts
Postponing R&D or advertising 
expenditures
Drawing down provisions or 
reserves in an overly aggressive 
manner
Accelerating sales
"Conservative" 
Accounting
Overvaluation of acquired in-
process R&D in purchase 
acquisitions
Accelerating R&D or advertising 
expenditure
Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs
"Neutral" Earnings
Earnings that result from a 
neutral operation of the process
Accounting Choices "Real" Cash Flow Choices
Within GAAP
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves
Delaying sales
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This study focuses on a specific type of earnings management called cosmetic earnings 
management. Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) are credited for labeling earnings management 
which involves small rounding of net earning numbers mostly upward to increase perception 
that the financial statement readers receive from earning figures. If pre-managed net earnings 
of a company are for example 4.95 million (currency irrelevant) executives are probably keen 
to manipulate that over the 5 million threshold, since it requires manipulation of only 0.05 
million (or approximately 1 %) but will change the first number from four to five. This kind 
of small rounding can be also seen in our everyday lives, especially in consumer prices. More 
often than not a consumer faces prices such as 1.95 or 29.90, since sellers want the consumer 
to have as affordable perception of the product as possible. Brenner & Brenner (1982) argued 
that due to limited memory capacity people tend to round number downwards even though 
sometimes it would be more accurate to round them upwards which requires more short term 
cognitive capacity. From an accounting perspective it’s quite reasonable to expect that 
companies would like to report (in most cases) as high profits as possible, within legal and 
moral limits, and take advantage of peoples cognitive shortcuts regarding their perception of 
numbers by rounding the net profit numbers upwards if it’s possible to change the first 
number with relatively small effort.  
 
Prior research regarding cosmetic earnings management include for example studies by 
Carslaw (1988), Thomas (1989) and Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) which all found evidence 
about rounding of net earnings. Cosmetic earnings management literature doesn’t take a stand 
how managers decide to manage earnings in order to achieve the desired result. One could 
argue that managers use accrual based earnings management since accurate net earnings 
figures aren’t available until after the reporting period has ended and real activities 
manipulation isn’t possible. Depending on the quality of company’s internal reporting 
company might have the option of using real activities manipulation if their estimates from 
internal reports indicate that the first digit of net earnings could easily be manipulated to be 
one larger than unmanipulated would be. 
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2.2. Incentives for earnings manipulation 
Graham et al. (2005) conducted thorough survey of more than 400 executives to investigate 
which factors drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. The survey included 
executives from public (87.1 %) and private (12.8 %) companies and revenues ranging from 
under hundred million (15.1 %) to over 5 billion (25.6 %). One of the most surprising findings 
of the survey is that 78 % of the executives are willing to sacrifice long-term value to smooth 
earnings. Executives see earnings as the key metric considered by outsiders over for example 
cash flows, which is in contrast with financial literature which emphasizes cash flows over 
earnings. Keeping cash flows constant managers prefer a lot smooth earnings, since smooth 
earnings are considered less risky and they ease the analyst’s task of estimating future 
earnings. The executives think that volatile earnings command a risk premium in the market 
and thus they seek to smooth them, this relationship between risk premium and earnings 
volatility is found in previous literature (Gebhardt et al. 2001). (Graham et al. 2005)  
 
2.2.1. Meeting or exceeding benchmarks 
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) found evidence that companies manage earnings to report 
positive earnings or earnings increases. According to them as much as 12 % of the companies 
that would have reported small earnings decreases without earnings management decided to 
manipulate earnings in order to report earnings increases. Even more companies, from 30 % 
to 44 %, used discretion to manipulate earnings in order to report positive earnings instead 
of small negative earnings. (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997) 
Executives seem to be aware, at least unconsciously, about the study by Barth et al. (1999) 
which indicates that capital market rewards companies which show constant earnings 
increase (benchmark in this case is previous year’s earnings) by higher price-earnings 
multiples than other firms.  
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On top of these two benchmarks, previous earnings and zero earnings, there are also analysts’ 
estimates that the companies are trying to exceed (Degeorge et al. 1999). Executives aren’t 
only managing earnings to beat analysts’ estimates but they are also trying to manipulate the 
estimates themselves downward in order to make it easier to beat them (Brown & Higgins 
2005; Bartov et al. 2002; Degeorge et al. 1999). Bartov et al. (2002) show that companies 
which meet or beat analysts’ estimates of future earnings enjoy higher returns at stock market. 
Since managers manipulate both the earnings and analysts’ expectations it’s not widely 
documented in previous literature how much earnings themselves are managed to beat 
analysts’ estimates. 
 
86.3 % of the surveyed executives by Graham et al. (2005) agree or strongly agree that 
managing earnings to meet earnings benchmarks helps the company to build credibility with 
the capital market. Executives also understand the relationship between earnings and stock 
price found in previous literature, 82.2 % of surveyed executives agree or strongly agree that 
managing earnings to meet benchmarks helps the company to maintain or increase the stock 
price of the company. The study indicates that most important benchmark for the executives 
is same quarter last year EPS (earnings per share), 85.1 % of the executives strongly agree or 
agree that this metric is important. Also analyst consensus estimates of EPS for current 
quarter, reporting a profit and previous quarter EPS are considered important, 73.5 %, 65.2 
% and 54.2 % of the executives, respectively, strongly agree or agree that these metrics are 
important. (Graham et al. 2005) 
 
2.2.2. Relationships to stakeholders 
Previous literature argues that executives have incentives manage earnings in order for the 
company to maintain good relationships also with other stakeholders than capital market, 
such as customers, suppliers, creditors and government (e.g. Bowen et al. 1995; Burgstahler 
& Dichev 1997; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; Boynton et al. 1992; Jones 1991; Key 1997). 
When purchasing a durable good consumer not necessarily just buy that product itself but 
also a service to keep it maintained and spare parts if the good happens to break in the future, 
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so they prefer a company that seems reasonable trustworthy that it can deliver those services 
and spare parts and won’t go into bankruptcy in the near future (Bowen et al. 1995). On the 
other side of the table also suppliers are assumed to prefer companies which show better 
financials, since they decrease the probability of credit loss, increase potential future cash 
flows and offer better ground for higher quality products in the eyes of the end user (Bowen 
et al. 1995). Study by Raman & Shahrur (2008) indicates that in the business-to-business 
setting suppliers and customers invest more in R&D (relationship specific investments in this 
context) when company’s earnings management is high, on the other hand they also find that 
customer-supplier relationships terminate sooner when the level of earnings management is 
high. According to the survey by Graham et al. (2005) 58.5 % of executives agree or strongly 
agree that they manage earnings to meet benchmarks to assure customers and suppliers that 
the business is on stable ground and company is worth cooperating with.  
 
Creditors usually require debt-covenants to prevent companies, and their managers, from 
investment and financing decisions which would decrease the value of the debtholders claims 
(DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994). These debt-covenants are often tied to accounting numbers of 
the company, and although there isn’t extensive evidence in the literature about covenants 
explicitly stating zero earnings, it’s quite reasonable to assume that if a company reports 
losses its debt won’t at least become cheaper and creditor will quite likely require assurance 
that their claims aren’t in danger (Roychowdhury 2006). Study by DeFond & Jiambalvo 
(1994) found that companies which were violating debt-covenants had been manipulating 
earnings especially year before the violation. Their data includes only companies which 
violated debt-covenants and thus were ‘failed’ at manipulating earnings but it’s quite possible 
that some companies which are close to violating terms of debt-covenants successfully 
manipulate their earnings in order to escape the violation. In the survey of Graham et al. 
(2005) 26.5 % of the executives agreed or strongly agreed that they manipulate earnings in 
order to avoid violating debt-covenants and 39.5 % agreed or strongly agreed that they 
manipulate earnings to achieve or preserve a desired credit rating. Thus it seems that debt 
and creditors don’t offer executives as much motivation to manage earnings as capital market 
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and customers and suppliers. One possible explanation for this is that debt-covenants aren’t 
so strict that they would affect the behavior of companies which aren’t in distress.  
 
Companies are mostly keen on manipulating earnings upwards in order to increase their stock 
price, relationship with customers and suppliers or avoiding debt-covenant violations. 
Sometimes companies though want to manipulate their earnings downwards for example 
reduce taxes or improve legislation form their point of view. Jones (1991) for example found 
evidence that during import relief investigation by United States International Trade 
Commission companies manipulated their earnings downwards in order to protect 
themselves from import goods. By showing weaker financials companies tried to pursue 
regulators to grant their industry an import relief which would protect the companies in that 
industry from competition overseas (Jones 1991). Key (1997) studied the television industry 
in the U.S. from the late 1980s to early 1990s and found that companies in that industry 
manipulated their earnings downwards in order to avoid more regulation from the 
government. That time consumers were unhappy with the excessive rate increases and poor 
service, among other things, by the television companies, so the government felt pressure to 
regulate the industry more to keep the citizens satisfied (Key 1997). To avoid increased 
regulation the companies in the television industry manipulated their earnings downwards to 
convince regulators that they are not charging excessive rates and can’t even afford much 
better customer service with current rates (Key 1997). One could argue that these kind of 
earnings manipulations in order to avoid regulation are history since the world has become 
more open, but still there are regulated industries such as healthcare and financial sectors that 
could try to manipulate their earnings to affect the regulators.  
 
Government offers also other incentive to manage earnings than affecting regulation in form 
of collecting taxes from the companies. Guenther (1994) finds evidence that companies 
decrease their earnings in response to changes in statutory corporate income tax rate brought 
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the corporate income 
tax rate from 46 % to 34 % which offered quite strong incentive for the companies to postpone 
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their earnings from one year to the next (Guenther 1994). Earnings management was found 
to be especially executed in large and leveraged companies (Guenther 1994). Lin (2006) 
found evidence in China’s developing economy framework that foreign investors there 
manage earnings in anticipation of changes in tax rates by making income-increasing accruals 
in the year before a tax-rate increase. The study indicates that the companies report on 
average 1.03 % higher discretionary accruals a year before the tax increase than in the year 
when the tax rate is increased, and with 15 % spread in the tax rate this would mean that the 
companies would save circa in taxes 0.15 % of their total assets (Lin 2006). Interestingly the 
study by Graham et al. (2005) didn’t ask the executives about role of regulation and taxes in 
motivation to manage earnings to meet benchmarks, in footnote 11 they plead for space 
considerations. Although the space consideration might be valid point from them one can 
also assume that currently these regulation and tax motivation are somewhat less important, 
at least from the researches point of view, than other motives studied in their research.  
 
2.2.3. Executive and employee compensation  
As discussed in section 2.2.1. stock market rewards companies for meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks such as previous year’s earnings and analysts’ consensus. Stock market 
thus offers incentives to executives, who want to please current shareholders or whose 
performance and income is tied to the stock price, to manage earnings. The shareholders of 
basically any company naturally want to make sure that executives of the company act in 
their interest and usually tie at least part of the compensation of executives to development 
of the share price (Jensen & Meckling1976). Thus high stock, and other forms of equity 
incentives, offered to executives quite likely increase their motivation to manage earnings 
(Cheng & Warfield 2005). Cheng & Warfield (2005) studied the relationship between equity 
incentives and earnings management and found evidence which indicates that executives 
with high levels of equity incentives are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts 
and are also less likely to report large positive earnings surprises which indicates income 
smoothing. Bergstresser & Philippon (2006) studied the relationship of equity incentives of 
CEO, chief executive officer, and earnings management and their study suggests that those 
CEOs whose overall compensation is more tied to development of company’s share price 
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manage companies with higher levels of earnings management. Bergstresser & Philippon 
(2006) also find evidence which suggest that CEOs and other insiders sell unusually large 
numbers of their shares of the company during period when the accruals are high (proxy for 
high levels of earnings management). These periods of high accruals and unusually large 
share liquidations are followed by low reported earnings and stock returns (Bergstresser & 
Philippon 2006). This indicates that executives aren’t managing earnings as much after they 
have liquidated part of their shares since they aren’t as vulnerable to the development of the 
stock price as they were before.  
 
Healy (1985) studied the relationship between executive bonus schemes and earnings 
management and found evidence which indicates that executives manage earnings 
downwards when their bonus schemes upper or lower bounds are binding. When the upper 
and lower bounds aren’t binding the study indicates that executives manage earnings upwards 
(Healy 1985). Results indicate that executives which face the bounds as binding exercise 
earnings management since they can’t increase their current period’s compensation but can 
try to defer it to the next period and thus increase their expected future reward (Healy 1985). 
Holthausen et al. (1995) found a bit contradicting evidence regarding executives’ bonus 
schemes and earnings management compared to the findings of Healy (1985). The results of 
Holthausen et al. (1995) indicates that executives aren’t willing to take a bath when the 
earnings are below lower bound of bonus scheme and won’t manage earnings downwards. 
Despite the lack of downwards earnings management at the lower bound of bonus scheme 
executives in that category might still be maximizing their wealth as Healy (1985) suggested 
according to Holthausen et al. (1995), since they might be unwilling to manage earnings 
downwards in fear of getting replaced or violating the firm’s lending agreements.  Like Healy 
(1985) Holthausen et al. (1995) found evidence that when the earnings are at the upper bound 
of bonus scheme executives manage earnings downwards, and are trying to maximize their 
future compensation by deferring earnings to the next period. Gaver et al. (1995) find 
completely contradictory evidence of earnings management at the lower bound of bonus 
scheme compared to findings of Healy (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995). The results of 
Gaver et al. (1995) indicate that executives below the lower bound of their bonus scheme 
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exercise income increasing earnings management and executives above the lower bound 
exercise income decreasing earnings management. Gaver et al. (1995) imply that executives 
are more motivated by smoothness of earnings than bonus maximization. Holthausen et al. 
(1995) point out that the limitations of the study by Gaver et al. (1995) include for example 
inability to examine accruals at the upper bound, since they don’t perform any tests at the 
upper bound, and lack of theoretical rationale why executives would be more motivated by 
the earnings smoothing than the bonus maximization as suggested by Healy (1985).  
 
Guidry et al. (1999) studied the relationship between bonus schemes of business unit 
managers and earnings management exercised by them within U.S. division of a large 
multinational conglomerate that manufactures a wide range of products. Guidry et al. (1999) 
find evidence consistent with Healy (1985) as business unit managers not facing binding 
upper or lower bound are associated with income increasing earnings management. Results 
of Guidry et al. (1999) indicate that bonuses of business unit managers increases by over 
$9000 per year or 60 % over the bonus without earnings management. Compared to the 
studies by Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995) and Holthausen et al. (1995) the study by Guidry 
et al. (1999) offers beneficial insight to individual units and earnings management in them 
compared to the aggregate earnings management of the company that might be diluted by 
contradicting actions of different units with different situations and motives.  
 
If the studies regarding bonus schemes and earnings management are a bit in conflict the 
opinions from executives are even more so. 40.1 % of the executives surveyed by Graham et 
al. (2005) strongly agree or agree that they manage earnings to meet benchmarks in order for 
their employees to receive bonuses. On the other hand also 30.3 % strongly disagree or 
disagree with the same statement, thus there doesn’t seem to be statistical difference between 
those who agree and disagree with the statement (Graham et al. 2005).  
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2.3. Methods to detect earnings manipulation 
 
2.3.1. Detecting accrual based earnings management 
During the 1970s and early 1980s majority of the earnings management literature focused on 
investigating the determinants of accounting choices, and from the mid-1980s focus of the 
literature switched to investigation of accruals (Beneish 2001). Beneish (2001) lists three 
reasons for the fast growth of accrual-based studies of earnings management: 
1) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) enable accruals to be used and if 
earnings are managed it’s more likely to happen via accruals than via cash flow  
components of earnings. 
 
2) Investigating effects of various accounting choices on earnings requires assumptions 
about the relative effects of those accounting choices on earnings and this induces 
error in the independent variable (Watts & Zimmerman 1990). This problem can be 
reduced by studying accruals.  
 
3) Investors are less likely to find out about earnings management if it’s unobserved 
component of accruals.  
 
Accrual-based earnings management is enabled by the GAAP which are trying to make 
earnings as informative about the company’s performance as possible mainly with the 
revenue recognition principle and the matching principle (Dechow 1994). On the other hand 
this also induces possibilities for the managers to manipulate earnings to increase their 
informativeness, to protect the company, for example, from debt covenant violations or for 
their own personal benefit if, for example, their compensation has bonus schemes based on 
earnings, or it’s tied to the development of the company’s stock price (Dechow 1994; Healy 
1985; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; Cheng & Warfield 2005).  
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When investigating accrual-based earnings management researchers face the same problem 
that investors face, how to measure the unobservable earnings management component of 
accruals (Beneish 2001)? Researchers are usually trying to separate total accruals to 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components to investigate how much managers have 
affected the total accruals with their own actions regarding discretionary accruals (Dechow 
et al. 1995). Total accruals are usually estimated by the difference between reported earnings 
and cash flow from operations or by calculating them from changes in accounts receivable, 
inventory, accounts payable, tax payables, other current assets and adding depreciation 
(Healy 1985; Hribar & Collins 2002). One of the first models to investigate earnings 
management with accruals was developed by Healy (1985) which assumes that total accruals 
is the same as nondiscretionary accruals (as illustrated by Dechow et al. 1995): 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝜏 =  
∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑝
 
𝑝
𝑃
 ,                            (1) 
where 
NDA = estimated nondiscretionary accruals; 
TA = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
p = 1,2,….P is a year subscript for years included in the estimation period; and 
τ = a year subscript indicating a year in the event period. 
 
 
After his model there have been several other more sophisticated models such as so called 
the Jones model, which itself or variation of it is quite often used in accrual based earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 1991; Subramanyam 1996). Young (1999) 
illustrated the Jones model as follows:  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
=  𝛼𝑖
1 
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
+  𝛽1𝑖
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
+  𝛽2𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑝,                            (2) 
where 
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TAip = total accruals for firm i in period p;  
ΔREVip = change in revenue from period p – 1 top for firm i;  
PPEip = gross plant property and equipment for firm i in period p;  
Aip-1 = beginning of period total assets for firm i; and 
p = 1,…, P, estimation years immediately prior to event year t. 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
−  [𝑎𝑖
1 
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
+  𝑏1𝑖
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
+  𝑏2𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑝
𝐴𝑖𝑝−1
],                 (3) 
where 
EDAip = estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in period p. 
 
Equation number 2 is used to calculate the “standard” level of total accruals and then these 
regression coefficients are plugged into the equation number 3 to calculate how much of the 
total accruals discretionary accruals account for (Young 1999). Both, time series and cross 
sectional regressions, often clustering industries together, have been used to calculate the 
“standard” level of total accruals, from where the coefficients are plugged into the equation 
number 3 (Jones 1991; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; McNichols 2000). Compared to the Healy 
(1985) model the Jones (1991) model is trying to account for changes in operating activity 
and economic environment to which managers can’t much use their own discretion (Dechow 
et al. 1995; Young 1999).  
 
Although discretionary accrual models are extensively used in the prior literature they have 
faced some criticism and improvements in measurement of earnings management is sought-
after within the researchers (Holthausen et al. 1995). Discretionary accrual models seem to 
detect earnings manipulation reasonably well in extreme cases but lack the power to detect it 
even in companies known to be generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) violators 
(Dechow et al. 1995; Beneish 1997; McNichols 2000). Other issue with discretionary accrual 
models is that discretionary accruals are known to be correlated with earnings performance, 
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which means that highly profitable firms are easily incorrectly found to manage their earnings 
upwards whereas least profitable firms are easily incorrectly found to manage their earnings 
downwards (Dechow et al. 1995; McNichols 2000). Also calculating the “standard” levels of 
total accruals from the equation 2 is quite ambiguous unless researcher could identify time 
period where the company didn’t exercise earnings management or companies with similar 
attributes, e.g. financial performance, economic environment etc., could be clustered together 
and certain degree of certainty that systematic earnings management is not exercised in any 
cluster (Dechow et al. 1995; McNichols 2000).  
 
2.3.2. Detecting real activities based earnings management  
Instead of managing accruals to manipulate earnings executives can affect real activities and 
manage earnings through them. Real activities manipulation is usually understood to mean 
actions such as increasing sales through price discounts, overproduction or reduction of 
discretionary expenditures, which wouldn’t have been executed in normal course of 
operations, by the management to alter financial reporting figures in attempt to meet certain 
reporting goals (Roychowdhury 2006; Xu et al. 2007). Compared to accrual management 
real activities manipulation have effects on operating activities and potentially can even 
reduce firm value, since for example increasing sales through price discounts in the current 
period can reduce cash flows in future periods (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010). 
Executives may want to exercise real activities manipulation instead of accrual manipulation 
since regulators such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are stricter about 
aggressive accounting choices with respect to accruals and aggressive manipulation of 
accruals is also more likely to face class action litigation, if manipulation was revealed 
(Gunny 2010). Manipulation of accruals is also somewhat limited by the accounting choices 
regarding accruals made last year due to the reversing nature of accrual accounting (Barton 
& Simko 2002). When exercising accrual based earnings management executives also face 
ex-ante uncertainty regarding how much accrual manipulation auditors are going to accept 
and ex-post consequences of over aggressive accrual based earnings management can result 
increase in cost of capital if revealed to the public (Gunny 2010; Dechow et al. 1996). On the 
other hand accrual based earnings management enables executives to manage earnings after 
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the reporting period, when they know how much earnings management they need in order to 
reach their goals, whereas real activities manipulation requires that transactions are executed 
before the end of the reporting period (Gunny 2010).  
 
As the researchers have faced problems with accrual based models there have emerged other 
tools to investigate earnings management, such as examining discontinuities in the 
distribution of reported earnings around for example zero earnings and last year’s earnings, 
which can act as a starting point for more detailed research (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997): 
 
 
   
Although this kind of investigation about the discontinuity around certain threshold (such as 
last year’s earnings or zero earnings) doesn’t reveal the magnitude of possible earnings 
management or how it’s exercised it reveals the potential companies that have exercised it 
and the magnitude and procedures of earnings management in those companies can be 
investigated separately (Beneish 2001; Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
Graph 1: Anomalous distribution of earnings example (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). Dotted red circle indicates 
the area of interest (added for emphasis). 
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Roychowdhury (2006) identified potential companies that had manipulated their earnings as 
those whose earnings scaled with total assets at the beginning of the year are over zero but 
under 0.5 %, as discussed in section 2.2.1. previous literature have found that companies 
manipulate earnings to exceed thresholds, such as zero earnings. After finding “suspect firm-
years” Roychowdhury (2006) estimated “normal” levels of cash flow from operations, cost 
of goods sold, inventory, production costs and discretionary expenses (defined as sum of 
advertising expenses, research & development expenses, selling, general and administrative 
expenses) with regressions for the whole sample. Example of estimating “normal” level of 
cash flow from operations (Roychowdhury 2006):  
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1 
𝐴𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝛥𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑡,                 (4) 
where 
CFOt = Cash Flow from Operation in time period t; 
At-1 = Total assets in time period t; 
St = Sales in time period t; and 
𝛥𝑆t = Change in sales from time period t – 1 to t. 
 
Abnormal cash flow from operations (and other variables of interest similarly) was defined 
by Roychowdhury (2006) as actual cash flow from operations minus “normal” cash flow 
from operations calculated with the coefficients from equation 4. After this Roychowdhury 
(2006) investigated how much cash flow from operations (illustrated below), cost of goods 
sold, inventory, production costs and discretionary expenses of suspect firm-years differed 
from rest of the sample with following regression: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑡 +  𝛽4(𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝑁𝐼)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , (5) 
where 
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SIZE = logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year;  
MTB = market-to-book ratio; and 
SUSPECT_NI = dummy variable to one if firm-years belong to the earnings category just right of        
     zero (earnings scaled with total assets over zero but under 0.5 %), zero otherwise. 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) found that suspect firm-years on average had 2 % of total assets lower 
abnormal cash flow from operations, when considered that in the study median cash flow 
from operations across all firm-years was 8 % of total assets, difference is meaningful. 
Suspect firm-years were found to have an average 5.91 % of total assets lower abnormal 
discretionary expenses, which again is quite meaningful considering that median 
discretionary expenses for all firm-years was 37 % (Roychowdhury 2006). Median 
production costs for all firm-years was around 79 % of total assets, and suspect firm-years 
were found to have an average 4.97 % of assets higher abnormal production costs 
(Roychowdhury 2006). These results indicate that companies which report just above zero 
earning use price discounts to temporarily increase sales, reduction of discretionary expenses 
and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold as tools to manage their earnings 
(Roychowdhury 2006).  
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3. International comparison of earnings management in previous 
literature 
 
International differences in earnings management is researched to some extent in previous 
literature but not overwhelmingly. One of the main benefits of cross-country studies in 
earnings management literature is that they enable researchers to study the effects of for 
example accounting standards, legal systems and incentives provided by the capital markets 
to earnings management of companies due to larger heterogeneity in these variables 
compared to a single country studies. This though affects the interpretation of results from 
cross-country studies. For example, a finding that greater investor protection is associated 
with smaller accruals doesn’t imply that that accruals are a good proxy for earnings 
management. The finding only suggests that accruals are a good proxy for decision usefulness 
associated with decisions and decision-makers subject to good investor protection. The 
definition of earnings management is decision-specific and in cross-country studies the 
decision environment is unique by design. (Dechow et al. 2010.) 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) studied differences in earnings management across 31 different countries 
from the perspective of investor protection. Shen & Chih (2005) also investigated earnings 
management from the perspective of investor protection but also from prospect theory point 
of view and more notably their study industry was banking sector which is quite often 
excluded from other earnings management studies due to the possibly tighter regulatory 
oversight. Burgstahler et al. (2006) compared differences in earnings management of 
European public and private companies. Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) 
studies used both accrual and loss avoidance (similar technic as illustrated in graph 1) 
measures to indicate the magnitude of earnings management across countries whereas Shen 
& Chih (2005) study used only loss avoidance measures. The most similar study in previous 
literature to this one is by Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) titled Who Is Miss World in Cosmetic 
Earnings Management? A Cross-National Comparison of Small Upward Rounding Of Net 
Income Numbers among Eighteen Countries. They investigated with the Benford’s law the 
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“winner” in cosmetic earnings management across 18 countries. Where Shen & Chih (2005) 
and Leuz et al. (2003) found evidence of relation between investor protection and earnings 
management Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) didn’t not document such relation. Table 2 presents 
the summary of these four studies: 
 
Authors, method(s) & time period Results 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) 
Deviations from the Benford’s law  
1995 – 1999 
Upward rounding more frequent in the bottom line than on top 
of an income statement. Cosmetic earnings management 
decreases with spending on auditing, increases with the 
latitude of country’s GAAP, cultural values (power distance), 
and the importance of management bonus schemes. 
Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki (2003), 
Accruals, smoothness of earnings, loss 
avoidance 
1990 – 1999 
Lower levels of earnings management associated with 
dispersed ownership, strong investor protection and large 
stock markets. Earnings management also negatively 
associated with the quality of minority shareholder rights and 
legal enforcement. 
Shen & Chih (2005) 
Loss avoidance & earnings decrease 
avoidance 
1993 – 1999 
Lower levels of earnings management associated with higher 
real GDP per capita. Prospect theory, due to finding that 
relationship between return and risk is positive for high 
earnings groups but negative for low earnings banks, 
associated with earnings management.  
Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz (2006) 
Accruals, smoothness of earnings, loss 
avoidance 
1997 – 2003 
Private companies associated with higher levels of earnings 
management. Strong legal systems are associated with lower 
levels of earnings management in both private and public 
companies.  
 
Table 2: Summary of selected studies about international comparison of earnings management. 
 
Data of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) consisted of time period between 1995 and 1999, almost 
22 000 firms from 18 countries and approximately 87 000 earnings observations. Their proxy 
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for cosmetic earnings management was deviation of second significant digit’s distribution 
from the Benford’s law which states that zero should be the second significant digit 
approximately 12 % of the time and nine should be the second significant digit circa 8.5 % 
of the time. Appearance of all the other numbers falls between these two in descending order. 
They hypothesized that firms exercise small upward rounding of positive income numbers 
from example 495 000 (currency irrelevant) to 503 000 since people are known to pay more 
attention to the first digit of any number and round number down to preserve memory. These 
small rounding of companies would lead to anomalous distribution of zeros and nines in the 
whole sample, which could be interpreted as cosmetic earnings management.  
 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) studied the differences between countries and found the 
“winner” of their cosmetic earnings management beauty pageant to be Spain and runner-ups 
Hong Kong and Singapore. “Losers” of the beauty pageant were Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Sweden and Norway) and United Kingdom where cosmetic earnings management 
appears to be small and not significant. They also found that certain institutional factors seem 
to play a role in differences of cosmetic earnings management across countries. Cosmetic 
earnings management seems to increase with the importance of management bonus schemes, 
power distance and to some extent with the latitude of country’s Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. Contrary to their expectation Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) did not 
found relationship between cosmetic earnings management and the value relevance of 
earnings, the alignment of financial and tax accounting or the degree of shareholder 
protection. (Kinnunen & Koskela 2003.) 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) found evidence of relationship between earnings management and investor 
protection. Their sample consisted of time period between 1990 and 1999, over 8 600 firms 
from 31 countries and approximately 71 000 firm-year observations. Their proxies for 
earnings management were smoothing reported operating earnings with accruals, correlation 
between changes in accounting accruals and changes in operating cash flow, magnitude of 
accruals and avoidance of small losses. These proxies for earnings management are quite 
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different to the one that Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) used and are quite widely used in 
previous earnings management literature. Leuz et al. (2003) found that top three countries of 
earnings management in their sample were Austria, Greece and South Korea and least the 
earnings were managed in Ireland, Australia and United States. Compared to the study of 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) Spain was ranked 14th (1st in Kinnunen & Koskela (2003)), Hong 
Kong 12th (2nd in Kinnunen & Koskela (2003)) and Singapore 8th (3rd in Kinnunen & Koskela 
(2003)) out of 31 countries in the study. Denmark, Sweden and Norway ranked 14th, 25th and 
26th respectively and United Kingdom 24th. One of the biggest differences in the rankings is 
the position of Australia which was fifth in the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) but 
second to last in the study of Leuz et al. (2003). This has been one of the problems in previous 
earnings management literature that different methods might bring contradictory results. 
Leuz et al. (2003) found relationship between lower levels of earnings management and 
dispersed ownership, strong investor protection and large stock markets. They also found 
negative association between earnings management and the quality of minority shareholder 
rights as well as legal enforcement, which was measured as the average score across three 
legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) which in turn are quite similar to few of the 
Governance Indicators used in this study. (Leuz et al. 2003.) 
 
Shen & Chih (2005) studied earnings management in the banking industry. Their sample 
consisted of time period between 1993 and 1999, over 47 000 banks from 48 countries and 
approximately 71 000 observations. As well as Leuz et al. (2003) Shen & Chih (2005) used 
loss avoidance as one of the proxies for earnings management. On top of loss avoidance Shen 
& Chih (2005) used earnings decrease avoidance as a proxy for earnings management. Not 
explicitly stated in their study but based on their own tables top three earnings management 
countries in the study of Shen & Chih (2005) were Egypt, Netherlands and Italy. Three 
countries where earnings were least managed were Norway, Kenya and Mexico. Compared 
to the study of Leuz et al. (2003) Austria (1st in Leuz et al. (2003)), Greece (2nd in Leuz et al. 
(2003)) and South Korea (3rd in Leuz et al. (2003)) ranked 8th, 30th and 28th respectively out 
of 47 countries (one of the countries was excluded due to insufficient data for ranking orders). 
Although Shen & Chih (2005) used similar proxy as Leuz et al. (2003) for the measurement 
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of earnings management results vary between them, but Shen & Chih (2005) did focus only 
on the banking industry and didn’t use any accrual based proxies for earnings management 
as Leuz et al. (2003) did. From the institutional factors Shen & Chih (2005) find that higher 
real GDP / capita is negatively associated with the degree of earnings management. Stronger 
investor protection and greater transparency in accounting disclosure are seen as key for 
reducing banks’ incentives to manage earnings. Contrary to the study of Leuz et al. (2003) 
Shen & Chih (2005) find that stronger enforcement of laws, measured as the average score 
across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998), results in more earnings 
management in low-income countries but not in high-income countries. Low earnings banks 
are found to have negative relationship between return and risk but high earnings banks the 
relationship is positive, which would imply that prospect theory have a role in earnings 
management of banks. (Shen & Chih 2005.) 
 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) used the same proxies for earnings management as Leuz et al. 
(2003); loss avoidance, magnitude of total accruals, smoothness of earnings relative to cash 
flows and the correlation of accounting accruals and operating cash flows. Sample in the 
study of Burgstahler et al. (2006) consisted of time period between 1997 and 2003 and 
approximately 378 000 firm-year observations, including public and private companies, from 
13 European countries. Privately held firms are found to exercise more earnings management 
than their European counterparts. Earnings management is found also to be negatively 
associated with strong legal systems and enforcement, which was again measured as the 
average score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998), as well as strong 
minority shareholder rights, extensive disclosure requirements and large and highly 
developed equity markets. Contrary to the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) Burgstahler 
et al. (2006) found that stronger tax alignment is associated with more earnings management, 
effect of which is mitigated by market pressure on public firms.  
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4. Hypothesis development, data & methods 
 
4.1. Hypothesis development 
Earnings management is a vastly researched field and multiple studies have found evidence 
about the occurrence of earnings management in various different research settings. The 
closest study to this one is the one by Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) which also applied the 
Benford’s law as a method to detect earnings management in international setting. The results 
of that study provide good hypotheses for this study. Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) found 
evidence about earnings management using the Benford’s law, so the first hypothesis of this 
study goes as follows: 
H1. Companies exercise small rounding of income statement numbers which 
results in deviations from the Benford’s law and can be interpreted as earnings 
management. 
 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) also find evidence about differences in earnings management 
across countries and this leads to the second hypothesis of this study: 
H2. Countries differ to the extent which companies operating in them exercise 
earnings management. 
 
The Governance Indicators as such haven’t been previously been a part of earnings 
management research but quite similar institutional indicators have been used as control 
variables since La Porta et al. (1998) in various studies. The results, regarding these 
institutional indicators, from these studies are somewhat mixed. Whereas Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) and Leuz et al. (2003) found evidence about negative relationship between 
institutional factors and earnings management Shen & Chih (2005) didn’t find relationship 
for high-income countries and actually is reversed for low-income countries in their study. It 
has to be reminded that the institutional factors in previously mentioned studies aren’t the 
same as the Governance Indicators used in this study, which also makes it a little bit more 
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difficult to construct hypothesis regarding earnings management and the Governance 
Indicators. All this said the third hypothesis goes as follows: 
H3. There is no relationship between earnings management and the 
Governance Indicators.  
 
Hypotheses 1 – 3 are the main hypotheses of this study and most of emphasis are put on them. 
Additional hypothesis is constructed based on the finding of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) 
that due to more extensive opportunities for manipulation rounding of accounting numbers 
is much more significant on the bottom line than in the top line of the income statement: 
H4. Rounding of accounting numbers is more persistent in the bottom line of 
the income statement than in the top line.  
 
 
4.2. Data 
The main source of data regarding accounting numbers for this study was Bureau van Dijk’s 
Orbis database, which consists of close to 180 million, public and private, companies 
worldwide. Net income and operating revenue in local currency and descriptive statistics in 
US dollars of 35 876 listed companies from 43 different countries from 2006 to 2014 was 
exported from Orbis database to MS Excel. The sample consists of all other industries than 
banks, insurance companies and other financial holdings (SIC codes 6000 – 6799), public 
administrative institutions (SIC codes above 9000) and private households (SIC code 8811). 
These industries are often excluded in the studies of earnings management due to the 
regulatory oversight banks for example face that affects their incentives to manage earnings. 
This study focuses on listed companies for the reason that they face similar oversight from 
government and investors for example, even though they might represent different 
geographical location. Listed companies also have motivations for earnings management that 
private companies won’t have, such as managing earnings in order to increase price of stock 
as discussed in section 2.2. The 43 different countries were chosen based on availability of 
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net income figures available in Orbis and initial analyze of variation in governance indicators 
of these countries. The time frame of this study ranges from 2006 to 2014 in order to examine 
larger set of net income figures than just those of one year’s but is limited to 2006 since years 
before that aren’t available in Orbis. Researched net income and operating turnover figures 
are in local currency since this study focuses on cosmetic earnings management that involves 
small rounding of numbers instead of larger earnings management which could be detected 
in any currency. Descriptive statistics about average revenue, net income and market 
capitalization are presented in millions of U.S. dollars to preserve comparability between 
countries. 
  
As can be expected countries differ to great extent by the listed companies located in them 
(see table 3). Whereas the revenue of average listed company from United States is a bit 
over 2 billion U.S. dollars, the revenue of average listed company from Serbia is only circa 
12 million U.S. dollars. Similar characteristic is noticeable also in net income and market 
capitalization figures. Also sample size from each country differs significantly for example 
there are known revenue for 2997 (on average from 2006 to 2014) listed companies from 
Japan but only for 108 (on average from 2006 to 2014) listed companies from winner of 
Kinnunen & Koskela 2003 beauty pageant Spain.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics about average revenue, net income and market capitalization of each country in millions of U.S. dollars and 
sample size for each variable over time frame 2006 – 2014. Sorted by average revenue. 
Q1 indicates the 25th percentile 
Q3 indicates the 75th percentile 
Country Average Revenue Mil USD N Average Net Income Mil USD N Average Market Cap. Mil USD N
Spain 4 355 970 281,0 998 4 999 737
Germany 4 068 4 379 161,3 4 376 2 607 3 870
Switzerland 3 427 1 407 340,6 1 408 6 162 1 231
France 3 149 5 394 136,0 5 386 2 828 4 598
Italy 2 780 1 699 132,6 1 699 2 135 1 478
United Kingdom 2 478 8 718 162,5 9 290 2 382 7 869
Hong Kong 2 397 1 215 315,1 1 220 4 486 1 109
Brazil 2 174 2 204 172,3 2 205 4 077 1 646
United States of America 2 066 15 862 115,7 15 890 3 003 11 106
Japan 1 957 26 975 51,2 26 978 1 173 24 300
Norway 1 583 1 212 107,1 1 212 2 267 769
Russian Federation 1 348 5 016 143,5 5 016 4 060 1 090
South Africa 1 065 1 456 87,6 1 472 1 403 1 342
Republic of Korea 1 048 12 343 37,6 12 369 682 9 979
Chile 952 1 262 67,0 1 263 1 625 936
Sweden 895 3 291 52,6 3 298 1 384 2 077
China 804 26 932 42,1 26 955 810 14 701
Bermuda 707 4 943 35,7 4 999 678 4 409
Australia 528 9 020 28,9 11 450 556 9 862
Taiwan 527 12 855 23,3 12 861 563 9 559
Thailand 483 4 288 26,2 4 291 463 3 373
Singapore 466 4 631 28,9 4 632 501 3 962
Greece 410 1 735 7,1 1 739 266 1 579
Israel 410 2 735 17,8 2 840 470 2 399
Canada 389 5 795 8,9 9 485 333 7 139
Cayman Islands 385 6 647 27,7 6 676 774 4 738
Indonesia 367 2 842 27,7 2 843 645 2 536
Philippines 366 1 347 26,6 1 376 517 1 118
Poland 300 3 741 14,1 3 755 236 2 879
Turkey 282 1 291 15,4 1 268 547 1 569
India 266 27 667 11,0 28 299 371 22 273
Islamic Republic of Iran 264 1 453 37,3 1 455 203 1 106
Egypt 237 1 266 33,5 1 266 390 1 022
Malaysia 234 6 593 20,0 6 637 358 5 733
Pakistan 157 2 895 8,9 2 939 114 2 290
Vietnam 69 5 839 3,2 5 844 38 2 928
Ukraine 65 3 880 0,4 3 880 198 393
Sri Lanka 50 1 583 3,3 1 587 72 1 463
Bulgaria 28 999 0,6 982 32 566
Romania 25 5 837 1,5 5 844 33 2 961
Serbia 12 6 182 0,0 6 182 271 33
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9 4 665 0,1 4 665 32 125
Republic of Moldova 4 3 409 0,1 3 375 NA 0
Q1 237 8,9 270
Median 466 28,9 560
Q3 1 583 107,1 2 168
std. dev 1 153 84,2 1 521
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Other crucial data source for this study was The World Governance Indicators (WGI) project 
where the governance indicators were retrieved for each country. The World Governance 
Indicators consists of six broad dimensions of governance; voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. All of the dimensions are defined in their official form next: 
 
Voice and Accountability 
“Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media.” 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.” 
 
Government Effectiveness 
“Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies.” 
 
Regulatory Quality 
“Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.” 
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Rule of Law 
“Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
 
Control of Corruption 
“Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests.” 
 
The World Governance Indicators are compiled from over 30 different data sources and four 
different types of sources: surveys of households and firms, commercial business information 
providers, non-government organizations and public sector organizations. The indicators, in 
their standard from, are normally distributed with mean zero, standard deviation of one and 
range approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating better governance but in 
this study units are transformed to range approximately from 0 to 5 and higher score 
indicating worse governance to make results more intuitive for the reader.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the Governance Indicators for each country, GDP / capita and stocks traded. Sorted by 
GDP / capita 
 
CC = Estimate for Control of Corruption 
GE = Estimate of Government Effectiveness 
PV = Estimate of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
RQ = Estimate of Regulatory Quality 
RL = Estimate of Rule of Law 
VA = Estimate of Voice and Accountability  
GDP / Capita = Average GDP / Capita of a country 2006-2014 
Stocks traded = Average stocks traded (% of GDP) 2006-2014 
Q1 indicates the 25th percentile 
Q3 indicates the 75th percentile 
 
Country CC GE PV RQ RL VA GDP / CAP Stocks traded
Norway 0.40 0.64 1.19 0.99 0.58 0.86 91 791 59 %
Bermuda 1.17 1.50 1.56 1.13 1.34 1.48 87 777 1 %
Switzerland 0.40 0.61 1.27 0.85 0.73 0.87 74 084 165 %
Cayman Islands 1.37 1.27 1.30 1.36 1.61 1.96 60 803 0 %
Sweden 0.18 0.49 1.41 0.83 0.54 0.92 54 399 NA
Australia 0.46 0.73 1.63 0.81 0.74 1.06 53 360 91 %
United States of America 1.24 0.95 2.06 1.06 0.87 1.38 49 680 250 %
Canada 0.40 0.71 1.60 0.81 0.69 1.12 47 400 90 %
Singapore 0.29 0.24 1.36 0.70 0.82 2.70 46 404 121 %
Germany 0.76 0.93 1.72 0.92 0.88 1.19 43 431 56 %
United Kingdom 0.94 0.94 2.10 0.76 0.74 1.21 42 309 89 %
France 1.06 1.05 1.83 1.19 0.99 1.30 41 768 61 %
Japan 0.93 0.98 1.65 1.47 1.17 1.46 39 546 102 %
Italy 2.50 2.05 2.03 1.61 2.12 1.55 36 481 77 %
Hong Kong 0.53 0.80 1.62 0.59 0.96 1.99 33 774 598 %
Spain 1.49 1.51 2.79 1.35 1.34 1.38 31 216 95 %
Israel 1.83 1.13 3.82 1.27 1.60 1.94 30 274 34 %
Greece 2.66 1.95 2.63 1.87 1.89 1.62 25 918 20 %
Republic of Korea 2.10 1.28 2.21 1.57 1.51 1.77 23 062 138 %
Taiwan 1.78 1.31 1.66 1.36 1.48 1.67 19 527 NA
Chile 1.01 1.24 1.83 1.05 1.18 1.41 12 657 19 %
Poland 2.09 1.86 1.51 1.52 1.84 1.47 12 577 14 %
Russian Federation 3.56 2.95 3.41 2.87 3.27 3.38 11 280 22 %
Brazil 2.50 2.54 2.49 2.34 2.50 1.97 9 933 35 %
Turkey 2.47 2.19 3.42 2.19 2.38 2.62 9 877 46 %
Malaysia 2.37 1.37 2.38 1.91 1.97 2.98 8 915 47 %
Romania 2.72 2.75 2.25 1.86 2.46 2.08 8 568 2 %
Bulgaria 2.71 2.39 2.17 1.85 2.60 1.98 6 732 NA
South Africa 2.41 2.11 2.52 2.14 2.39 1.92 6 663 94 %
Serbia 2.79 2.55 2.94 2.52 2.90 2.23 5 790 2 %
Islamic Republic of Iran 3.49 2.98 4.12 4.20 3.48 4.07 5 551 4 %
China 3.10 2.40 3.16 2.72 2.83 4.13 4 771 105 %
Thailand 2.82 2.31 3.93 2.31 2.70 3.00 4 619 57 %
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.82 3.23 3.20 2.60 2.87 2.63 4 414 NA
Ukraine 3.48 3.25 2.52 3.02 3.31 2.60 3 258 1 %
Indonesia 3.25 2.70 3.35 2.90 3.14 2.57 2 830 13 %
Egypt 3.05 2.88 3.41 2.66 2.62 3.65 2 484 26 %
Sri Lanka 2.90 2.68 3.42 2.70 2.58 3.02 2 464 4 %
Philippines 3.30 2.52 4.13 2.72 3.08 2.56 2 180 12 %
Republic of Moldova 3.19 3.14 2.89 2.60 2.89 2.61 1 725 1 %
Vietnam 3.13 2.76 2.39 3.11 3.03 3.98 1 412 9 %
India 3.01 2.48 3.73 2.87 2.54 2.07 1 264 57 %
Pakistan 3.57 3.26 5.17 3.08 3.24 3.34 1 116 NA
Q1 1.01 0.98 1.65 1.06 0.99 1.41 4 619 11 %
Median 2.41 1.95 2.38 1.85 1.97 1.97 12 577 46 %
Q3 3.01 2.68 3.35 2.66 2.83 2.63 42 309 92 %
std. dev 1.08 0.89 0.94 0.86 0.91 0.89 24 422 102 %
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The GDP / capita figure is used as a control variable and is calculated as an average of 2006 
– 2014 in current U.S. dollars retrieved from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD 
National Accounts data files, except for Cayman Islands where the GDP / capita in 2006 was 
only found from previous sources. 2010 and 2013 GDP / capita in current U.S. dollars for 
Cayman Islands was found in the United Nations Statistics Division’s data files. Average 
GDP / capita of 2006 – 2014 was decided to be used to avoid possible mistakes in the data 
and since the Governance Indicators are describing quite gradually changing aspects of 
government average was deemed better control variable for them than just GDP / capita of a 
year. Here the GDP / capita values are in their original form but in the actual research they 
were changed to log form to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
 
As can be seen in table 4 estimates of Governance Indicators vary greatly between countries, 
for example whereas the estimate for Control of Corruption for Sweden is only 0.18 
indicating very low level corruption the estimate for same indicator for Russia is 3.56 
indicating quite high corruption. Overall estimates for Control of Corruption are quite as 
expected; Sweden, Singapore, Norway and Australia have indicator estimates less than 0.5 
and on the side of the spectrum China, Russia, India, Iran, Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, Ukraine and Moldova have indicator estimates more than 3.0. Mean 
estimate for control and corruption is 2.03, which means that the sample countries in this 
study have better control of corruption score than the whole population. For the Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism none of the sample countries score less than 
1, for example Norway has score of 1.19 and Switzerland 1.27. Iran and Philippines score 
again quite high scores 4.12 and 4.13 respectively. Sample’s mean score for the estimate of 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism is 2.49 which means that sample 
countries have quite similar estimates for this Governance Indicator as the whole population.    
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Similar indicators for governance have been used for example in the study by La Porta et al. 
(1998).  In that study similar indicators are averaged together, since they have quite strong 
correlation with each other. In results section similar type of averaging is also done for the 
indicators in this study since as can be seen from see table 5, most of them are highly 
correlated with each other.   
 
 
4.3. Method 
Proxy for earnings manipulation in this study is the same as for example in the study of 
Carslaw (1988) and Kinnunen & Koskela (2003), deviations from the Benford’s law. During 
the late 19th century astronomer and mathematician Simon Newcomb made a discovery that 
the first volumes of the tables of logarithms of his institution were more worn than the 
following volumes. This implied that people made more frequent consultations for numbers 
starting with 1 or 2 than for numbers starting with 8 or 9. Independently from Newcomb’s 
work Frank Benford made same notion about the same tables of logarithms and in his article 
1938 he composed numerous sets of data, from physical constants to baseball results, and 
showed that the appearance of the first significant digit followed a particular distribution, 
which is now known as the Benford’s law. First significant digit of a number means its 
CC GE PV RQ RL VA
CC 1
GE 0.95 1
PV 0.79 0.74 1
RQ 0.93 0.92 0.79 1
RL 0.97 0.96 0.77 0.95 1
VA 0.77 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.80 1
Table 5: Correlation matrix of the Governance Indicators for the sample 
CC = Estimate for Control of Corruption 
GE = Estimate of Government Effectiveness 
PV = Estimate of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
RQ = Estimate of Regulatory Quality 
RL = Estimate of Rule of Law 
VA = Estimate of Voice and Accountability 
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leftmost non-zero digit, for example the first significant digit of the number 587 is 5 and the 
first significant digit of 0.312 is 3. (Sandron & Hayford 2002.) 
  
 
 
Under the Benford’s law first significant digit is approximately 30.1 % of the time 1 and only 
approx. 4.6 % of the time 9, appearance of all the other numbers fall between these two in 
descending order as can be seen from graph 2. The Benford’s law applies to lists of numbers 
that represent the relative sizes of similar phenomena, such as net incomes, daily trading 
volumes on stock exchange or market values. Examples outside of financial context could 
include population of countries or cities. The list of numbers should not have a subjective 
minimum or maximum cut-off point such as “companies with revenue over one million” in 
case of list of revenues. The Benford’s law doesn’t apply to lists of numbers which are formed 
by human though such as supermarket prices or Automated Teller Machine withdrawals 
neither the law apply to assigned numbers such as telephone numbers, car license plate 
numbers or personal identification numbers. (Nigrini & Mittermaier 1997.) 
Graph 2: Distribution of first significant digit under the Benford's law. 
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The formula for the frequency under the Benford’s law of any given first significant digit can 
be written as follows (as cited in Sandron & Hayford 2002): 
𝐹𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(1 + 1/𝑑),                                (6) 
where 
𝐹𝑑  = The frequency of the first significant digit d. 
 
Similarly the formula for the frequency under the Benford’s law of any given second 
significant digit can be written as follows (modified from Nigrini & Mittermaier 1997): 
𝐹𝑑2 = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(1 + (1/𝑑1𝑑2))
9
𝑑1
,                                (7) 
where 
𝐹𝑑2 = The frequency under the Benford’s law of the second significant digit d2, 
and 
d1  = first significant digit. 
 
Hill (1995) made the interesting notion about the properties of significant digits that they are 
not independent as one might expected but dependent. For example the unconditional 
probability that the second significant digit is two is approximately 10.9 % but given that the 
first number is one the conditional probability of the second significant digit being two is 
approx. 11.5 %.  
 
Formulas for the significant digits beyond these two mentioned above are not in the scope of 
this study but the following table from Nigrini (1996) illustrates how the distribution of the 
digits starts to get closer to uniform distribution as the digit of interest gets farer away from 
the first digit: 
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As can be seen from the table 6 the difference of expected frequency of one and nine as first 
significant digit is over 25 percentage points but as fourth significant digit the difference is 
only approximately 0.03 percentage point. The drop in the expected frequency of one is 
already quite significant between the first and second digit as it falls from approx. 30.1 % to 
approx.11.4 % and nine also almost doubles its expected occurrence as it rises from approx. 
4.6 % to approx. 8.5 % when changing the point of interest from the first digit to the second.  
 
One of the biggest advantages of Benford’s law as a method to detect earnings management 
is its intuitiveness over the models presented in section 2.3. Accrual based models, as 
explained in the section 2.3.1. usually requires the researchers to separate discretionary and 
non-discretionary parts of the accruals and this is usually done with quite crude models. 
Compared to this the Benford’s law offers very intuitive tool to detect earnings management 
as it gives the researchers the theoretical “pure” frequency of numbers and the observed 
frequency can be compared to this. As explained in the section 2.3.1. previously extensively 
used accrual based models have also faced criticism for inefficiency to detect earnings 
management properly in less than extreme cases. Compared to methods regarding beating 
thresholds, such as zero profits or analyst estimates (see graph 1), the Benford’s law enables 
investigation of larger set of companies, since the sample of interest isn’t limited to only 
companies just beating zero profits or analyst estimates but includes all of the companies 
which potentially have exercised earnings management to change the first digit of their 
earnings figures. For cross-country study the Benford’s law offers especially suitable tool 
since analyst estimates from various countries might be difficult to obtain and accrual policies 
might vary between different countries and accounting standards.   
Table 6: Expected frequency of digits as first, second, third and fourth significant digit under the Benford’s law (Nigrini 1996). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
As 1st 30.10 % 17.61 % 12.49 % 9.69 % 7.92 % 6.70 % 5.80 % 5.12 % 4.58 %
As 2nd 11.97 % 11.39 % 10.88 % 10.43 % 10.03 % 9.67 % 9.34 % 9.04 % 8.76 % 8.50 %
As 3rd 10.18 % 10.14 % 10.10 % 10.06 % 10.02 % 9.98 % 9.94 % 9.90 % 9.86 % 9.83 %
As 4th 10.02 % 10.01 % 10.01 % 10.01 % 10.00 % 10.00 % 9.99 % 9.99 % 9.99 % 9.98 %
Digit
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Carslaw (1988) was the first one to use the Benford’s law in accounting context (Nigrini & 
Mittermaier 1997). Carslaw (1988) studied the occurrence of second significant digit in 
positive income numbers of New Zealand listed companies. He hypothesized that companies 
would prefer to round for example unmanaged net profit of 296,563 New Zealand Dollars 
(NZD) to 302,560 NZD since people usually pay more attention to the first significant digit 
of a number and prefer to round the number down even though it would be more logical to 
round number up (Carslaw 1988). This would lead to the fact that the list of net profits would 
show abnormally high frequency of zero as second significant digit and abnormally low 
frequency of nines as second significant digit (Carslaw 1988).  
 
 
Graph 3: Expected frequency of second significant digit under the Benford's law and observed frequency in  
net income numbers of New Zealand companies (Carslaw 1988). 
 
Carslaw (1988) did found evidence that zero occurs more often than it should under the 
Benford’s law and that nine occurs less than it should, statistically significantly at 1 % and 
10 % level respectively (see graph 3). As reader notes distribution of second significant digit 
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under the Benford’s law is much closer to uniform distribution than distribution of the first 
significant digit which was illustrated in graph 2. Under the Benford’s law second digit is 
approximately 12 % of the time zero and approximately 8.5 % of the time nine, occurrence 
of all the other numbers falls between these two in descending order.  
 
Following the studies by Carslaw (1988) and Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) this study uses 
anomalous distribution, compared to the theoretical proper distribution obtained from the 
Benford’s law, of second significant digit as a proxy for earnings management. Although this 
method haven’t been used as much in previous literature to detect earnings management as 
for example accrual based or loss avoidance (and related) methods it offers intuitive tool to 
study earnings management especially between various countries which may differ to some 
extent in the accounting principles and procedures. To investigate does the deviation of 
observed frequency of second significant digit from its expected frequency is statistically 
significant the following z-statistic formula from Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) is used: 
 
𝑧𝑆𝐷 =  
𝑓𝑆𝐷
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷)
√𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷)[1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷)]
 ,                 (8) 
where 
𝑓𝑆𝐷
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = observed frequency of second digit SD, 
𝑛 = the sample size, and 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷) = expected frequency of second digit SD. 
 
To investigate is the whole distribution of observed second significant digits significantly 
different than its expectation under randomness the following Chi-square statistic formula 
with 9 degrees of freedom from Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) is used: 
𝜒2 =  ∑
|𝑓𝑆𝐷
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷)|2
𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷)
9
𝑆𝐷=0
 ,               (9) 
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To measure appearance and magnitude of cosmetic earnings management in each country 
and in order to measure its association with the Governance Indicators this study uses three 
metrics developed by Kinnunen & Koskela (2003), which vary in breadth of cosmetic 
earnings management measurement: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑀1 =  
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑝
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷0),                 (10) 
 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑀2 =  
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑝
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷0) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷9) −
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃9
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑝
,                 (11) 
 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑀3 =  
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑝
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷0) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷9) −
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃9
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑝
 
+ 
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑁9
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷9) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷0) −
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑁0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑁
,                              (12) 
 
where 
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = Observed frequency of zeros as second digit in positive net income figures, 
𝑛𝑝 = Sample size of positive net income observations, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷0) = Occurrence of zero as second digit under the Benford’s law, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝐷9) = Occurrence of nine as second digit under the Benford’s law, 
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑃9
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = Observed frequency of nines as second digit in positive net income figures, 
𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑁9
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = Observed frequency of nines as second digit in negative net income figures, 
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𝑓𝑆𝐷𝑁0
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 = Observed frequency of zeros as second digit in negative net income figures, 
and 
𝑛𝑁 = Sample size of negative net income observations. 
 
CEM1 (equation 10) simply measures the percentage unit deviation (expected to be surplus) 
of zeros as second significant digit in positive net income figures from the occurrence of 
zeros under the Benford’s law.  
CEM2 (equation 11) adds to CEM1 the percentage unit deviation (expected to be deficit) of 
nines as second significant digit in positive net income figures from the occurrence of nines 
under the Benford’s law. This metric is based on the expectation that cosmetic earnings 
management in positive net income figures is exercised especially by rounding nines up to 
zeros.  
CEM3 (equation 12) takes into account also negative net income figures by adding to CEM2 
the percentage unit deviation of zeros and nines as second significant digit in negative net 
income figures from the occurrence of zeros and nines under the Benford’s law. This metric 
is based on the expectation that cosmetic earnings management is exercised in reverse in 
negative net income figures by rounding zeros as second significant digit up to nines, as this 
would soften the blow of net losses.  
 
Cosmetic earnings management metrics, CEM1, CEM2 and CEM3, are calculated for each 
country separately and thus cosmetic earnings management can be investigated in relation to 
institutional factors such as the Governance Indicators here. This possible association 
between cosmetic earnings management and the Governance Indicators is researched with 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression models: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑀1𝑦 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝐶𝐶. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 + 𝛽2(𝐺𝐸. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 +  𝛽3(𝑃𝑉. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 +  𝛽4(𝑅𝑄. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 +
 𝛽5(𝑅𝐿. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 + 𝛽6(𝑉𝐴. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 + 𝛽7(𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑦 + 𝛽8(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑)𝑦 + 𝜀𝑦, (13)  
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where 
𝐶𝐸𝑀1𝑦 = CEM1 for country y, 
𝛼 = coefficient, 
𝐶𝐶. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate for Control of Corruption for country y, 
𝐺𝐸. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate of Government Effectiveness for country y, 
𝑃𝑉. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism for 
country y, 
𝑅𝑄. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate of Regulatory Quality for country y, 
𝑅𝐿. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate of Rule of Law for country y, 
𝑉𝐴. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 = Estimate of Voice and Accountability for country y, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑦 = Average GDP / Capita of a country 2006-2014 as a control variable for 
     country y (control variable),  
Stocks traded = Value of shares traded as a % of GDP (control variable), 
and 
𝜀𝑦 = error term for country y.  
 
Equation 13 is also calculated similarly for the two other cosmetic earnings measures, CEM2 
and CEM3.  
 
As discussed in the section 4.2. several of the Governance Indicators are highly correlated 
with each other, most notably estimates for control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law. To mitigate this problem in the regression experienced in 
equation 13, another regression model is constructed: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑀1𝑦 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 (
𝐶𝐶. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 + 𝐺𝐸. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 + 𝑅𝑄. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦 + 𝑅𝐿. 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑦
4
)
𝑦
+  𝛽2(𝑃𝑉. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦
+ 𝛽3(𝑉𝐴. 𝐸𝑆𝑇)𝑦 + 𝜀𝑦,                                  (14) 
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This regression model (equation 14) is quite similar to the previous one expect that estimates 
for control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law are 
averaged together and treated as a single variable for any given country. All of these four 
estimates also concentrate more on the quality of governance in the country and to which 
extent people have faith in and act by the norms of society than the other two estimates which 
deal more with accountability and stability. One can hypothesize that quality of governance 
in any country will also affect to some degree for example to the auditing quality of that 
country. Also the people’s faith in the norms of society can be considered to have an 
association with the degree that external financial documents can be trusted, i.e. how much 
they might include earnings management.  
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Overview of the results 
First the overview of cosmetic earnings management across all the sample firms and 43 
countries is presented in the table 7. Top panel of the table 7 gives the overview picture of 
cosmetic earnings management of net sales and it’s quite in line with the results of Kinnunen 
& Koskela (2003). This sample seems to have bigger surplus of zeros, 0.81 %, as Kinnunen 
& Koskela (2003) had surplus of 0.35 %. The deficit of zeros in this sample, 0.18 %, is in the 
same ballpark that Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) had (deficit of 0.22 %). Whereas Kinnunen 
& Koskela (2003) didn’t have any significantly different from zero results for digits 1 – 8, 
this sample has significant deficit of 0.17 % of threes and fours. The sample in this study 
regarding net sales figures is almost three times larger than equivalent in the study of 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) and as Thomas (1989) noted comparing z-statistics across 
studies with different sample sizes can be misleading.   
 
As can be seen from middle panel of the table 7 cosmetic earnings management is quite 
persistent throughout the sample firms and countries. In the net profits significantly more 
zeros are observed than expected and on the other hand nine occurs significantly less than it 
should under the Benford’s law. Throughout the sample it also looks like that companies 
manipulate not just nines upwards to zeros but also to ones. Also sixes, sevens and eights 
seem to be manipulated upwards to convey better earning figures. Although the deviation of 
sixes, sevens and eights is statistically speaking significantly meaningful caution has to be 
exercised when comparing z-statistics as stated previously. The magnitude of deviation of 
zeros and nines from the expected frequency presented here is quite in line with the study of 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003). The surplus of zeros in net profits presented in the table 6 is 
circa 1.33 percentage units and in the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) it was 1.30 
percentage units. The deficit of nines in this sample is a bit less than it was in the study of 
Kinnunen & Koskela (2003), here it’s circa 0.49 percentage units and in their study it was 
0.61 percentage units.
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All 43 countries 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
Expected frequency 11.97 % 11.39 % 10.88 % 10.43 % 10.03 % 9.67 % 9.34 % 9.04 % 8.76 % 8.50 % 100 %
Net sales
Number of observations 31 628 28 250 26 652 25 399 24 402 23 945 22 867 22 196 21 520 20 588 247 447
Observed percentage 12.78 % 11.42 % 10.77 % 10.26 % 9.86 % 9.68 % 9.24 % 8.97 % 8.70 % 8.32 % 100 %
Percentage unit deviation 0.81 % 0.03 % -0.11 % -0.17 % -0.17 % 0.01 % -0.10 % -0.07 % -0.06 % -0.18 % 0.0
z-value/Chi-square 12.44 0.42 -1.74 -2.69 -2.79 0.11 -1.69 -1.21 -1.11 -3.21 167
Prob 0.00 0.68 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.09 0.22 0.27 0.00 0.00
*** ** ** ** ***
Net profit
Number of observations 23 824 20 794 19 419 18 594 17 410 17 158 16 442 15 916 15 283 14 346 179 186
Observed percentage 13.30 % 11.60 % 10.84 % 10.38 % 9.72 % 9.58 % 9.18 % 8.88 % 8.53 % 8.01 % 100 %
Percentage unit deviation 1.33 % 0.21 % -0.04 % -0.05 % -0.31 % -0.09 % -0.16 % -0.16 % -0.23 % -0.49 % 0.0
z-value/Chi-square 17.29 2.86 -0.58 -0.74 -4.42 -1.35 -2.39 -2.33 -3.46 -7.50 363
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.46 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** ** *** * * *** *** ***
Net loss
Number of observations 10 010 9 274 8 808 8 444 8 121 7 872 7 808 7 296 7 284 7 183 82 100
Observed percentage 12.19 % 11.30 % 10.73 % 10.29 % 9.89 % 9.59 % 9.51 % 8.89 % 8.87 % 8.75 % 100 %
Percentage unit deviation 0.22 % -0.09 % -0.15 % -0.14 % -0.14 % -0.08 % 0.17 % -0.15 % 0.11 % 0.25 % 0.0
z-value/Chi-square 1.96 -0.85 -1.40 -1.36 -1.32 -0.79 1.68 -1.53 1.14 2.56 21
Prob 0.05 0.40 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.43 0.09 0.13 0.26 0.01 0.01
* * *
Second significant digit
Table 7: Overview of cosmetic earnings management across the sample companies and countries. 
Expected frequency             = expected percentage proportion of given second significant digit under the Benford’s law 
Percentage unit deviation   = observed percentage minus expected percentage under the Benford’s law 
z-value  = in the digit column the standard normal statistic for the equality of observed and expected frequency of second significant digit 
Chi-square  = in the total column the Chi-square statistic for equal observed and expected distributions with 9 degrees of freedom 
Prob  = two tailed significance level of z-value / Chi-square: * (at least 5%), ** (at least 1%), *** (at least 0,1%). 
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Interestingly it appears that fours are also manipulated to one way or another. In the sample 
of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) companies were found to report more fives as second 
significant digit than expected under the Benford’s law, but in the sample of this study that 
is evident so the deficit of fours can’t be explained solely by that. One could argue that some 
companies would prefer to manipulate four down in order to have “reserves” for following 
years on the other hand some companies probably would like to manipulate four to at least 
five in order to reach the halfway milestone to a larger figure, as was the case in the sample 
of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003).  
 
The deviations from expected frequencies in net losses is presented in the bottom panel of 
the table 7. As can be seen from that there aren’t visible pattern how companies manipulate 
their net losses. Zeros and nines both have a small surplus, and other digits, except sixes and 
eights, have a deficit. Based on the aggregate data one of the metrics, CEM3, doesn’t seem 
to apply very well to this sample, since it’s calculated on the assumption that the cosmetic 
earnings management would be reversed in net losses (surplus of nines and deficit of zeros). 
CEM3 for each country is still calculated and used in the latter parts of results section, but 
it’s not emphasized and caution has to be exercised when interpreting results regarding that 
metric. It shall be noted that the total observations of net losses and net profits calculated 
together is larger than net sales observations. Apparently for some reason Odin database has 
net profit / net loss figures for some companies but not their net sales figures. This shouldn’t 
affect the findings of this study. 
 
Based on the deviations presented in the table 7 the H1 hypothesis can be confirmed since as 
shown especially in the middle panel of the table (net profits) zeros occur more often than 
they should and nines appear less often. The table 7 also confirms the H4 hypothesis since 
the deviations of zeros and nines appears to be larger in the net profits than in the net sales 
and thus companies appear to exercise more manipulation in the bottom line of the income 
statement than in the top line.  
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Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) compare in their study cosmetic earnings management in United 
States and elsewhere, since almost half of their sample’s observations are from U.S. Even 
though in this study U.S. doesn’t account for as much of the sample similar comparison is 
provided.  
 
U.S. observations have larger surplus of zeros than rest of the sample which is in line with 
the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003), but in their study the surplus for U.S. observations 
was below 0.5 % and in the sample of this study it’s over 1 %. In the study of Kinnunen & 
Koskela (2003) U.S. observations have larger deficit of nines than the rest of the sample 
whereas in the sample of this study U.S. observations actually have surplus of nines as rest 
of the sample has deficit. Compared to the rest of the sample in this study U.S. observations 
have deficit of ones and surplus of twos and fours as rest of the sample have surplus of ones 
and deficit of twos and fours. This finding is also in line with the results of Kinnunen & 
Koskela (2003). In the sample of this study U.S. observations have larger deficit of threes, 
sixes, and sevens than rest of the sample. In fives U.S. observations have deficit whereas rest 
Graph 4: Percentage unit deviations of second digit in net sales. 
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of the sample has small surplus and in eights U.S. observations have surplus whereas rest of 
the sample have deficit. 
 
  
 
In the graph 5 percentage unit deviation of second digit in net profits is presented for the 
whole sample, U.S. and all countries except U.S. Surplus of zeros is smaller in the U.S. 
observations, as it was also in the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003), there difference just 
wasn’t as big as it’s in this sample . Surprisingly there’s also a small surplus of nines in the 
U.S. observations, which wasn’t the case in the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) where 
the deficit of nines was larger for the U.S. observations than for the rest of the sample. For 
the U.S. observations largest deficits occur in two and eight, 0.66 % and 0.39 %, respectively. 
In the study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) number two had second biggest deficit after nines 
in the U.S. observations but number eight had surplus. Largest surplus, after zero, for U.S. 
Graph 5: Percentage unit deviation of second digit in net profits. 
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observations occurs in six and seven, where the rest of the sample have deficits and in the 
study of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003) U.S. observations also had deficits.  
 
 
In the graph 6 percentage unit deviation of second digit in net losses is presented for the 
whole sample, U.S. and all countries except U.S. From here it’s quite apparent that the third 
CEM metric, CEM3, isn’t working as hypothesized. Cosmetic earnings management isn’t 
reversed in this sample as it was in the sample of Kinnunen & Koskela (2003). 
 
  
Graph 6: Percentage unit deviation of second digit in net losses. 
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Table 8: CEM metrics for each country. 
 
In the parenthesis is presented each country’s rank in given metric, rank 1 implying largest cosmetic earnings management 
in given metric.  
‘avg rank’ indicates the average rank of the country in the three CEM metrics.  
Sorted by the average rank. 
Q1 indicates the 25th percentile 
Q3 indicates the 75th percentile 
Country avg rank
Spain 0.037 (4) 0.050 (3) 0.077 (1) 2.7
Ukraine 0.050 (2) 0.056 (2) 0.062 (5) 3.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.048 (3) 0.044 (4) 0.061 (6) 4.3
Egypt 0.024 (6) 0.035 (6) 0.064 (4) 5.3
Cayman Islands 0.024 (7) 0.035 (7) 0.046 (9) 7.7
Greece 0.017 (15) 0.034 (8) 0.067 (3) 8.7
Hong Kong 0.021 (11) 0.034 (9) 0.049 (7) 9.0
Poland 0.024 (5) 0.028 (10) 0.025 (18) 11.0
South Africa 0.020 (12) 0.021 (21) 0.075 (2) 11.7
Bulgaria 0.058 (1) 0.086 (1) -0.007 (39) 13.7
China 0.017 (17) 0.021 (20) 0.046 (10) 15.7
Malaysia 0.019 (14) 0.027 (11) 0.021 (22) 15.7
Bermuda 0.014 (23) 0.024 (16) 0.039 (12) 17.0
Australia 0.015 (20) 0.024 (18) 0.026 (16) 18.0
Indonesia 0.019 (13) 0.024 (15) 0.014 (26) 18.0
Chile 0.021 (10) 0.039 (5) -0.017 (40) 18.3
Taiwan 0.011 (26) 0.020 (24) 0.047 (8) 19.3
Thailand 0.023 (8) 0.024 (17) 0.007 (34) 19.7
France 0.023 (9) 0.019 (26) 0.016 (25) 20.0
Israel 0.008 (31) 0.024 (14) 0.023 (20) 21.7
Sri Lanka 0.011 (27) 0.018 (27) 0.040 (11) 21.7
Russian Federation 0.017 (16) 0.026 (12) -0.005 (38) 22.0
Serbia 0.014 (22) 0.021 (22) 0.018 (23) 22.3
Sweden 0.016 (18) 0.021 (23) 0.012 (28) 23.0
Canada 0.012 (24) 0.026 (13) 0.008 (33) 23.3
India 0.014 (21) 0.020 (25) 0.010 (31) 25.7
Brazil 0.012 (25) 0.023 (19) 0.000 (36) 26.7
Turkey 0.016 (19) 0.012 (33) 0.012 (29) 27.0
Philippines 0.008 (33) 0.003 (38) 0.036 (14) 28.3
Romania 0.007 (34) 0.012 (31) 0.022 (21) 28.7
Islamic Republic of Iran 0.006 (35) 0.002 (40) 0.037 (13) 29.3
Singapore 0.003 (41) 0.012 (32) 0.027 (15) 29.3
Republic of Korea 0.008 (32) 0.010 (34) 0.017 (24) 30.0
Germany 0.009 (28) 0.016 (28) 0.001 (35) 30.3
Japan 0.004 (39) 0.010 (35) 0.024 (19) 31.0
Vietnam 0.006 (38) 0.002 (39) 0.025 (17) 31.3
Pakistan 0.006 (37) 0.016 (29) 0.010 (30) 32.0
United States of America 0.008 (29) 0.008 (36) 0.009 (32) 32.3
Republic of Moldova -0.001 (42) 0.005 (37) 0.013 (27) 35.3
Italy 0.006 (36) 0.013 (30) -0.054 (43) 36.3
Switzerland 0.008 (30) 0.000 (42) -0.036 (42) 38.0
United Kingdom 0.004 (40) 0.002 (41) -0.003 (37) 39.3
Norway -0.017 (43) -0.026 (43) -0.029 (41) 42.3
Q1 0.008 0.012 0.008
Median 0.014 0.021 0.021
Q3 0.021 0.027 0.040
CEM3CEM1 CEM2
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Table 8 shows the different CEM metrics for each country, the rank of each country in given 
metric and also the average rank of a country in all the three CEM metrics. As a reminder 
CEM1 (equation 10) was calculated as a percentage unit deviation of observed frequency of 
zeros from the expected frequency under the Benford’s law (positive values indicating 
surplus of zeros). The highest score in CEM1 is Bulgaria’s 0.058 which means that net 
income figures of Bulgarian companies have a 5.8 percentage unit surplus of zeros compared 
to the Benford’s law. Next in the CEM1 metric are Ukraine and Bosnia & Herzegovina with 
5.0 and 4.8 percentage unit surplus, respectively. The lowest score for CEM1 metric is 
Norway’s -0.017 which actually indicates that net income figures of Norwegian companies 
have a 1.7 percentage unit deficit of zeros, which in turn is against the hypothesis of this 
study regarding the deviation of expected and observed frequency of zeros. The next lowest 
scores are by Moldova and Singapore -0.1 and 0.3 percentage units, respectively.  
 
As equation 11 showed CEM2 is calculated by adding the deviation of observed frequency 
of nines from the expected frequency to the CEM1 (deficit of nines being positive value). 
Assuming that companies round nines as second significant digit to zeros CEM2 should be 
larger than CEM1 and for 33 countries out of 43 it is. The highest score in CEM2 is also by 
Bulgaria 0.086 indicating a total of 8.6 percentage unit of zeros and nines from the expected 
frequency under the Benford’s law. Next two countries in the CEM2 rankings are Ukraine 
and Spain with 5.6 and 5.0 percentage unit total deviations, respectively. The CEM2 scores 
for all of these countries are higher than their CEM1 scores, indicating that cosmetic earnings 
management occurs in these countries as expected. The lowest score in CEM2 is again by 
Norway, -0.026, indicating a total negative deviation of 2.6 percentage units. For some reason 
it seems that Norwegian companies have less than expected zeros but more than expected 
nines. It appears that Norwegian companies manipulate zeros as second significant digit 
down to nines for some reason which might be related to minimizing taxes or other aspect 
outside the scope of this study. The next two lowest scores in CEM2 belong to Switzerland 
and United Kingdom 0.000 and 0.002, respectively. Since the score of CEM2 for both of 
these countries are smaller than their CEM1 it appears that for some reason their observed 
frequency of nines is above the expected frequency.  
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CEM3 (equation 12) adds the assumed surplus of nines and deficit of zeros in negative 
income figures to the CEM2 metric. Table 7 showed us that it’s not very suitable for the 
whole sample but for 22 out of 43 countries it works as hypothesized, indicating that the 
cosmetic earnings management is reversed in net losses (i.e. companies are rounding zeros 
as second significant digit down to nines). Now Spain ranks the highest with a score of 0.077 
indicating 2.7 percentage unit increase to the CEM2 and 7.7 percentage unit total deviation 
when surplus of zeros and deficit of nines in positive income figures and deficit of zeros and 
surplus of nines is added together. Other top three countries in the CEM3 metric are South 
Africa and Greece with scores of 0.075 and 0.067, respectively. For all of these three 
countries CEM3 works as hypothesized. The lowest scores for CEM3 are by Italy, 
Switzerland and Norway, -0.054, -0.036 and -0.029, respectively. For all of these countries 
CEM3 is smaller than CEM2, indicating that metric isn’t working for them as hypothesized.  
 
From the table 8 H2 hypothesis can be confirmed since countries differ to quite great extent 
in the CEM metrics. In every metric at least one country has a negative value and largest 
values are over 0.05. Also the difference between first and third quartile is over 0.013 in all 
of the metrics.  
 
5.2. Regression results 
Regression results for CEM1 are presented in table 9. Results for each of the Governance 
Indicators without any control variables are in columns A-F. Column G is the result of model 
presented in equation 13 where all of the six Governance Indicators are as independent 
variables and GDP / capita and stocks traded (not available for Sweden, Taiwan, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan) are control variables. Column H is the result of model 
presented in equation 14 where four (control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law) of the Governance Indicators are averaged together, due 
to high correlation with each other, and two other Governance Indicators are on their own. 
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As a reminder to the reader the estimates for the Governance Indicators are transformed here 
so that the higher value of estimate means poorer governance.  
 
Excluding constants three coefficients from all of the models have a significantly non-zero 
value with at least 10 % confidence level. In the column B estimate for government 
effectiveness have a significant value of 0.004, meaning that lower government effectiveness 
would lead to higher cosmetic earnings management. With one unit higher estimate of 
government effectiveness, magnitude which separates Poland and Iran, country’s CEM1 
would be 0.4 percentage point higher meaning similar change in the deviation of zeros from 
the Benford’s law.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Regression results for CEM1. 
 
38 observations for model in G column, 43 for all others. 
Number below coefficient is the p-value. 
* (at least 10%), ** (at least 5%), *** (at least 1%).  
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) ( E )  ( F ) ( G ) ( H )
Constant 0.010 ** 0.008 0.013 ** 0.115 ** 0.008 * 0.013 ** 0.010 0.015 **
(0.029) (0.101) (0.030) (0.024) (0.090) (0.023) (0.802) (0.020)
CC 0.003 0.000
(0.137) (0.996)
GE 0.004 * 0.004
(0.061) (0.681)
PV 0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.656) (0.966) (0.289)
RQ 0.002 -0.008
(0.363) (0.291)
RL 0.004 * 0.008
(0.093) (0.512)
VA 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.566) (0.845) (0.413)
AVG (CC;GE;RQ;RL) 0.009 **
(0.045)
GDP / CAP -0.001
(0.940)
Stocks traded 0.000
(0.537)
R² 0.053 0.083 0.005 0.020 0.067 0.008 0.128 0.106
CEM1
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Similar change in CEM1 occurs if rule of law estimate is increased one unit, magnitude which 
separates Israel and Egypt. When the regression model from equation 13 is executed with all 
the Governance Indicators and both of the control variables none of the coefficients have 
significantly non-zero value. With the regression model from equation 14 where the estimates 
for control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law are 
averaged the coefficient for this averaged variables receives a value of 0.009 with 
significance level of at least 5 %. This implies that if the average of the above mentioned 
estimates increases by one unit the CEM1 score would be 0.9 percentage point higher 
meaning similar change in the deviation of zeros from the Benford’s law. Across the different 
models R2 is quite modest, even at its best it’s just circa 12.8 % and mostly under half of this. 
Similarly to table 9 regression result for CEM2 are presented in the table 10:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Regression results for CEM2. 
 
38 observations for model in G column, 43 for all others. 
Number below coefficient is the p-value. 
* (at least 10%), ** (at least 5%), *** (at least 1%). 
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) ( E )  ( F ) ( G ) ( H )
Constant 0.016 *** 0.014 ** 0.020 ** 0.020 *** 0.015 ** 0.020 *** 0.010 0.022 **
(0.009) (0.030) (0.013) (0.004) (0.027) (0.008) (0.851) (0.011)
CC 0.003 0.000
(0.280) (0.998)
GE 0.004 0.010
(0.182) (0.459)
PV 0.001 0.001 -0.004
(0.847) (0.776) (0.423)
RQ 0.001 -0.021 *
(0.230) (0.063)
RL 0.003 0.010
(0.241) (0.537)
VA 0.001 0.002 -0.004
(0.806) (0.753) (0.482)
AVG (CC;GE;RQ;RL) 0.009
(0.136)
GDP / CAP 0.000
(0.966)
Stocks traded 0.000
(0.802)
R² 0.029 0.043 0.001 0.001 0.033 0.002 0.156 0.058
CEM2
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Coefficients from the regression models regarding CEM2 have quite similar magnitude as in 
the table 9 but only one of them is statistically significant at least 10 % level. That’s the 
coefficient for the regulatory quality estimate in the “full” regression model with all the other 
Governance Indicators and control variables and it receives negative value of 0.021 with at 
least 10 % significance level. Negative value implies that poorer regulatory quality would 
lead to smaller earnings management, even though this sounds somewhat counterintuitive 
prior research has reasoned similar phenomena in investor protection (see Dechow et al. 2010 
footnote 62). Once again the R2 scores for the regression models are quite modest, even at its 
best it’s just circa 15.6 % and mostly under third of this. 
 
Regression results for CEM3 are presented in table 11:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Regression results for CEM3. 
 
38 observations for model in G column, 43 for all others. 
Number below coefficient is the p-value. 
* (at least 10%), ** (at least 5%), *** (at least 1%). 
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) ( E )  ( F ) ( G ) ( H )
Constant 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 ** 0.001 -0.007 0.002
(0.291) (0.404) (0.557) (0.478) (0.049) (0.911) (0.947) (0.881)
CC 0.006 0.001
(0.153) (0.968)
GE 0.007 0.156
(0.138) (0.536)
PV 0.006 0.003 -0.001
(0.212) (0.763) (0.924)
RQ 0.008 -0.002
(0.126) (0.926)
RL 0.007 -0.016
(0.152) (0.630)
VA 0.010 ** 0.012 0.010
(0.048) (0.269) (0.208)
AVG (CC;GE;RQ;RL) 0.000
(0.992)
GDP / CAP -0.001
(0.971)
Stocks traded 0.000
(0.548)
R² 0.049 0.053 0.038 0.056 0.049 0.092 0.134 0.092
CEM3
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Coefficients from the columns A – F are a bit higher than in the tables 9 and 10 but only the 
coefficient for voice and accountability estimate is statistically significant at least 5 % level, 
as it receives the value of 0.010. Implying that one unit higher estimate for voice and 
accountability, magnitude separating Thailand and Iran, would increase the CEM3 score by 
1 percentage point. But as previously stated CEM3 metric isn’t working as expected, at least 
for the whole sample and various countries, so too much emphasis shouldn’t been laid into 
the results in the table 11. R2 results are once again fairly modest, even though in most cases 
they are a bit higher than in the table 10.  
 
Based on the regression results from the tables 9 – 11 it appears that the Governance 
Indicators doesn’t explain the variation in cosmetic earnings management between countries. 
Intuitively one would assume that better governance would lead to smaller levels of cosmetic 
earnings management but one could argue that with very poor governance executives would 
no longer need to exercise earnings management because they are fully entrenched (see 
Dechow et al. 2010 footnote 62). So it might be that there are two opposing forces regarding 
the relationship between cosmetic earnings management and the Governance Indicators. In 
some countries poorer governance might increase cosmetic earnings management and in 
some it might reduce it, and that’s why this study isn’t able to find meaningful relationship 
between cosmetic earnings management and the Governance Indicators. 
 
5.3. Correlation and rank regression results 
As the main regression models of this study fail to produce as much meaningful results as 
desired, additional tests are provided. First of which is simple correlation matrix between all 
three CEM metrics and all of Governance Indicators:  
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Table 12 reveals, as suspected based on the regression results that the CEM metrics and the 
Governance Indicators aren’t highly correlated with each other. CEM1 receives highest 
correlation with the estimate for government effectiveness and even that is just 0.289. Lowest 
correlation CEM1 has with the estimate for political stability and absence of violence, only 
0.07. CEM2 has across the board less correlation with the governance indicators than CEM1 
but also has the highest correlation with the estimate for government effectiveness and lowest 
also with the estimate for political stability and absence of violence, 0.208 and 0.03 
respectively. CEM3 has highest correlation with the estimate for voice and accountability 
and lowest with the estimate for political stability and absence of violence, 0.303 and 0.194 
respectively.  
 
Also rank regression models are tried to find is there a relationship between CEM metrics 
and the Governance Indicators. In this study a rank regression model is meant to mean a 
regression where a country’s rank in CEM1 (and in CEM2) is the dependent variable in the 
model and the country’s rank in the Governance Indicators are the independent variables. As 
the CEM3 metric seemed not be working in the sample of this study as expected (see graph 
6) rank regression results for that metric aren’t reported here. Control variables, GDP / capita 
and stock traded, are  dropped in the rank regression results since they failed to have 
significant values in the regular regression models and thus doesn’t appear to control for 
much in the sample of this study. CEM metrics are ranked as presented in the table 8, where 
the country with the highest score for example in CEM1 receives the rank of one, the second 
highest rank of two and so on. The estimates for the Governance Indicators are also ranked 
in similar manner where the country with highest score (indicating poorest governance based 
Table 12: Correlation matrix between CEM metrics and the Governance Indicators. 
CC GE PV RQ RL VA
CEM1 0.230 0.289 0.070 0.142 0.259 0.090
CEM2 0.169 0.208 0.030 0.035 0.183 0.039
CEM3 0.222 0.230 0.194 0.237 0.222 0.303
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on that indicator) for example in the estimate for rule of law receives the rank of one, the 
second highest rank of two and so on. 
 
The results from the rank regressions aren’t presented but overall the results from rank 
regressions doesn’t provide much more to the original regression results. Rank regression 
regarding CEM2 metric confirms the negative relationship between it and the estimate for 
regulatory quality, when all of the Governance Indicators are present. On the other hand rank 
regressions also confirm the results from original regressions that CEM metrics and the 
Governance Indicators don’t have very significant relationship across the board and the H3 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis was set out to research cosmetic earnings management in an international context 
and investigate does it have a relationship with the Governance Indicators. Countries appear 
to differ by the extent to which companies located in them exercise cosmetic earnings 
management. Although the sample of this study is only 43 countries and all of the continents 
aren’t equally represented cosmetic earnings management can be quite well described as a 
worldwide phenomenon. Although this study fails to find conclusive evidence about the 
relationship between cosmetic earnings management and the Governance Indicators some 
evidence was found about negative linkage between the CEM2 metric and the estimate for 
regulatory quality.  
 
The estimate for regulatory quality is supposed to “capture perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.” (The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project). The negative relationship found in this study between the CEM2 metric and the 
estimate for regulatory implies that as the country’s governance improves regarding 
regulatory quality cosmetic earnings management in the companies increases as well. 
Although negative linkage between cosmetic earnings management and basically any of the 
Governance Indicators seems counter intuitive one could argue that as the government 
improves the environment in which private companies operate through policies and 
regulations consumers of financial statements also trust the figures more which in turn 
enables companies to exercise cosmetic earnings management. The exact mechanism by how 
the regulatory quality possible affects the cosmetic earnings management is beyond the scope 
of this study and is left for future research.  
 
Another finding of this study is that the companies located in the United States appear to 
exercise more cosmetic earnings management in net sales figures than the companies in rest 
of the 42 sample countries. It might be that the U.S. companies face more pressure from the 
capital markets to constantly increase their sales and this leads the executives to use more 
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discretion in the top line of the income statement. Another explanation could be that the 
auditors and regulators in U.S. focus more on the other lines of the income statement and 
don’t notice small rounding of numbers in the net sales line of the income statement. The 
reasons why U.S. companies appear to exercise more cosmetic earnings management in the 
top line of the income statement is left for future research.  
 
One of the limitations of this study and its findings is regarding the method used to detect 
cosmetic earnings management. The explicit assumption of this study is that list of 
unmanaged earnings would obey the Benford’s law, at least regarding the second significant 
digits, since the deviations from the Benford’s law is interpreted as a cosmetic earnings 
management in this study. The Benford’s law has previously been used in an accounting 
context as well as to investigate cosmetic earnings management so the explicit assumption 
that unmanaged earnings follow the Benford’s law is quite reasonable for this study. Another 
assumption of this study is that companies are interested in manipulation earnings figures 
and not for example earnings before interest and taxes. It might be that in some contexts the 
consumers of financial statements are more interested about the operating figures of the 
company compared to the earnings figures and if companies acknowledge this they might 
want to manipulate those operating figures. This assumptions is especially important in this 
study since the expectation is that companies want to manipulate their earnings in a manner 
which increases the first significant digit by one. If companies were more interested 
manipulating for example earnings before interest and taxes figure it could go unnoticed in 
this study if interests and taxes are large enough to make the first digit of earnings smaller 
than that of earnings before interest and taxes. Even though individual companies might be 
interested to manipulate other than earnings figures this study has a sample size of almost 
180.000 (net profit) observations and companies for the most part at least are interested in 
manipulating earnings figures or manipulate operational figures which also result the first 
digit of earnings to be one larger than that of unmanipulated earnings.  
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This study has investigated the relationship between cosmetic earnings management and the 
Governance Indicators and can act as a reference point for future research regarding other 
studies from similar context. One of the suggestions for future research is to investigate 
whether companies possibly manipulate also operational figures such as earnings before 
interest and taxes and does the governance of the country have an effect which line of the 
income statement companies manipulate. Another suggestion for future research is to 
investigate do cosmetic earnings management and other institutional factors then the 
Governance Indicators have a relationship.  
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